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CASE COMfMENTS
If there were ever valid reasons to justify the immunity rule, they
no longer exist. A charity should be required to be just before being
generous. It should redress the injuries it inflicts before redressing
injuries inflicted by others. A quick survey of the confusing results of
the immunity cases based on the various theories, riddled with excep-
tions and distinctions, will but point up the validity of Pascal's state-
ment, "How ludicrous is reason, blown with a breath in every di-
rection."
PrTER P. GRIFFIN
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE AND JOINT GUARDIAN
STATUTES
Some courts have barred the recovery of one parent from a defend-
ant who has negligently harmed his child because of the contributory
negligence of the other parent.1 Due to the relationship between the
spouses it was thought that the recovery in such cases would inevitably
redound to the benefit of the contributorily negligent spouse and
that it would, therefore, be inequitable to allow either spouse to re-
cover.2 This concept of imputing negligence3 from one parent to the
other has, however, generally been abandoned as the legal obliga-
tions between the present day plaintiff-parent and his contributorily
negligent spouse have been relaxed, so that they are no longer suffici-
ent to sustain the burden of imputation.
4
The bare marital relationship has been rejected as an adequate
1Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co., 248 Pa. 503, 94 Atl. 269 (1915); Nichols v.
Nashville Housing Authority, 187 Tenn. 683, 216 S.W.2d 694 (1949).
2Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13 Texas L. Rev. 161 (1935).
3Since the earliest years of the law, the negligence of some persons has been
held to be chargeable to others who stood in certain relationships to the negli-
gent parties-e.g., a man and his wife, a master and his servant. In Thorogood
v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849), imputed negligence emerged as a
distinct tort doctrine. In this case a passenger was charged with the negligence of
a driver on the ground that the driver was under the passenger's control. In
Waite v. North Eastern Ry., i El. Bl. & El. 719, 12o Eng. Rep. 679 (1858), the
suit of the injured child was barred on the basis of his grandfather's contributory
negligence in caring for him.
The concept was short lived, however, in its native England. The doctrine
is generally held to have been overruled by The Bernina, 13 App. Cas. 1 (1888).
Oliver v. Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co., [1933] 1 K.B. 35, spe-
cifically overruled Waite v. North Eastern Ry., supra, and further declared that
the doctrine no longer existed in England.
"Prosser, Torts § 54 (2d ed. 1955).
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basis for the imputation of negligence from one spouse to the other.5
The courts have likewise disapproved of the so-called agency theory,
under which one spouse is said to be the agent of the other for the
purpose of protecting their child. 6 The theory that the husband and
wife are engaged in the joint venture of successfully rearing the child
has also been found to be an inadequate legal basis for carrying
negligence from one parent to the other3
The rejection of these relationships as a sufficient basis for the im-
putation of negligence has recently produced a novel argument based
upon an unusual application of a reasonably common statute. This
type of statute, referred to as a "joint natural guardian" statute,
changes the exclusive guardianship of the father, as it existed at com-
mon law, into a joint guardianship of both father and mother.
8 It
is not surprising to find that most of the litigation involving these
statutes has been concerned with rights pertaining to the custody
of the ward and with matters relating to his property;9 consequently,
it is somewhat startling to note the unusual application of the Florida
joint natural guardian statute in the dissent in Ward v. Baskin.10
This case deals with an appeal by a plaintiff-father from a lower court
decision which, because of the contributory negligence of his wife, had
denied him a recovery from a defendant who had negligently in-
jured his minor child. In reversing the lower court's decision, so as
to allow a recovery by the plaintiff, the Florida Supreme Court stated
that in Florida there is a "long established rule against the imputa-
tion of negligence."" The dissenting opinion by Justice Parks,1 2 who
would deny recovery in this case, points out that in Florida the
father's common law guardianship has been changed by virtue of the
joint natural guardian statute which vests in both parents concurrently
6 lllingworth v. Madden, 135 Me. 159, 192 At. 273 (1937); Herrell v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102 (1929); 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 159
(195o).
6Darian v. McGrath, 215 Minn. 389, 1o N.W.2d 403 (1943); Hessler v. Nelipowitz,
55 N.Y.2d 692 (Syracuse Munic. Ct. 1945). "The 'agency' of the parent to look
after the child is of course the barest fiction...." Prosser, Torts § 54 at 3ol (2d
ed. 1955).7Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal. 2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 (1954); Bailey v. Centerville, 115
Iowa 271, 88 N.W. 379 (19o); Danner v. Chandler, 204 Okla. 693, 233 P.2d 953
(1951).
sFor example see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 57-646 (1957); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.13 (1955);
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 8-105 (1953); Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-101 (1956).
OId., see annotations.




the rights, duties, and responsibilities that had formerly been those of
the father alone.' 3 Justice Parks reasons, therefore, that "the custody
of the children by either of the natural guardians is also the custody
of the other and therefore the negligence of either in the execution
of the duties and responsibilities toward the children is the negli-
gence of the other."'
4
Although Justice Parks speaks in terms of imputing contributory
negligence, his rationale appears to differ from the theory generally
used to support imputed negligence in common law jurisdictions.
His interpretation of the statute unites the two guardians into a single
entity, whose right hand is responsible for the negligent acts of the left.
If this view were to be generally accepted, the states having joint
natural guardian statutes might find themselves drawn to the same
conclusions that are reached under a strict application of the doc-
trine of imputed negligence; that is, barring the non-negligent spouse's
cause of action.' 5 It is very doubtful that the legislatures intended by
the enactment of joint guardian statutes to accomplish such a result.
The theory propounded by Justice Parks appears to be closely akin
to that taken by the courts within the majority of our community
property jurisdictions which bar recovery by the non-negligent
spouse.' 6 These holdings result from the general determination that
"Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.13 (1955).
1494 So. 2d at 862.
'1Under the rule of Waite v. North Eastern Ry. (see note 3 supra) the injured
child has been denied recovery because of the contributory negligence of his cus-
todian. Fortunately, this would never occur under the view of the dissent to Ward
v. Baskin. Justice Parks himself states, "It is hardly necessary to add that the
child's right of recovery against such wrongdoer would not be prejudiced." 94 So.
2d at 862. The significance of this point lies in the fact that the right of the
child himself to sue for his injuries is not yet certain in all American common law
jurisdictions. If the negligence of the parent is imputed to the child, his suit
will be barred. "The barbarous rule, which denies to the innocent victim of
the negligence of two parties recovery against either, and visits the sins of the
father upon the children, was accepted in several American states, but is now
overruled everywhere except in Maryland, Maine, and perhaps Delaware." Prosser,
Torts § 54 at 3O (2d ed. 1955).
"""At the outset we may state that appellants present the affirmative of this
question [that the negligence of one spouse should be charged to the other], forti-
fied by an unanimity of authority in their favor from each of the community
property states which have passed upon it, namely: Texas, Louisiana, Washington,
California, Idaho and Arizona." Frederickson & Watson Const. Co. v. Boyd, 6o
Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627, 628 (1940).
Nevada has held that the cause of action in this type of case is separate prop-
erty on the theory that it does not fall within the scope of property acquired after
marriage and consequently refused to charge one spouse with the negligence of
the other. Section 3355 N.C.L., as quoted in Frederickson & Watson Const. Co. v.
Boyd, supra, provides in part as follows: "All property of the wife owned by her
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"the right to recover damages for personal injuries is a chose in action
and property; and this right of action having been acquired during
the marriage is community property, as is consequently, the damages
or compensation recovered for such personal injuries."u 7 As a result,
the doctrine of contributory negligence will bar the action in behalf of
the community, a part of which contributed to the mishap; but even
though the negligence of one spouse is said to be "imputed" to the
other,' 8 the theory would appear to differ from the common law doc-
trine of imputed negligence. Under the common law viewpoint a non-
negligent plaintiff will be barred from recovery by the negligence of
another only if the relation between the two is such that the plaintiff
would be liable for such negligence if he were a defendant. 19
In the California case of Dull v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry.,
2 o
the non-negligent father was denied a recovery for the death of his wife
and children in a grade crossing accident caused primarily by defend-
ant's negligence, because the wife was found to be contributorily
negligent in her operation of the vehicle.2 ' In so holding, the court
stated, "It is the law that the contributory negligence of the mother
is a defence to an action on behalf of the community to recover for
death of the children, because in caring for the children she repre-
sents and acts for the community .... ,22 This rationale is similar to
before marriage, and that acquired by her afterwards by gift, bequest, devise
or descent, with the rents, issues, and profits thereof, is her separate property."
Section 3356 provides: "All other property acquired, after marriage, by either hus-
band or wife, or both, .. is community property." These Nevada statutes are
similar in language to §§ 162 and 164 of the Civil Code of California, which con-
sider a cause of action that arises after marriage to be community property and,
therefore, charges the negligence of one spouse to the other.
"'i de Funiak, Principles of Community Property § 82 at 223 (1943).
'$Takashi Kataoka v. May Department Stores Co., 60 Cal. App. 2d 177, 14o P.2d
467 (1943); Crane v. Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 288, 144 P.2d 356 (1943).
"9Prosser, Torts § 54 (2d ed. 1955). It is interesting to note the interplay be-
tween two different concepts of imputed negligence. The English labeled this
practice of charging one individual with the negligence of another, "identifica-
tion." See note 3 supra. The concept has come into our law as the doctrine of
"imputed" negligence, connoting the transfer of the negligence from one party
to another, thus the problem at common law of the eventual failure of the various
relationships existing between the parties, to sustain the burden of this transfer.
The concept of imputation in the view of Judge Parks and of the majority of
the community property states would differ in that it is not based on a transfer
of the negligence of one party to another, but upon a device by which the negli-
gence of one party actually becomes the negligence of the other.
'027 Cal. App. 2d 473, 81 P.2d 158 (1938).
"The contributory negligence of the mother barred the action by the father
in spite of the fact that she died in the mishap and could not possibly have en-
joyed any damages recovered.
2281 P.2d at 162.
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the reasoning used by Justice Parks in his novel application of the
Florida joint natural guardian statute.23 The language of the Cali-
fornia court-"her negligence, if any, in caring for the children
is the negligence of the husband" 24-is identical in content with that
used by Justice Parks-"the negligence of either in the execution
of the duties and responsibilities toward the children is the negligence
of the other."2 5 Thus, in the community property states, as in the view
of Justice Parks, the negligence of one parent literally becomes the
negligence of the other.
Under the early common law, when the husband controlled his
wife and her property, there was a good reason for imputing the neg-
ligence of one spouse to the other. The close identity of the spouses
provided an adequate theoretical basis for the imputation.26 Since
the emancipation of the married woman and the enactment of the
Married Women's Acts, however, the ancient concept of the identity
of the spouses has been rejected, and, there being no remaining con-
cept sufficient to bind a man and his wife together as a legal entity,
as there is in the community property states, the imputation of neg-
ligence between spouses has declined.27 To revive the doctrine of
imputed negligence in a common law jurisdiction upon the basis of a
statute which makes the parents joint natural guardians of their minor
children would reverse the modern trend.28 An absence of authority
is not alone sufficient to discredit the novel theory propounded by the
dissenting opinion in Ward v. Baskin, but a careful evaluation of its
statutory basis and the overall policy considerations that affect tort
litigation raise doubt as to its ultimate value.
JOSEPH C. KNAKAL, JR.
'94 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1957).
2181 P.2d at 162.
-94 So. 2d at 862.
- 3 8 Am. Jur., Negligence § 234 (1941).
=Ibid.
MRestatement, Torts § 487 (1934).
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